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Metaphor and “Poetic” Language

ABSTRACT: Theorists often associate certain “poetic” qualities
with metaphor – most especially, producing an open-ended, holistic perspective which is evocative, imagistic and affectively-laden.
I argue that, on the one hand, non-cognitivists are wrong to claim
that metaphors only produce such perspectives: like ordinary literal speech, they also serve to undertake claims and other speech
acts with propositional content. On the other hand, contextualists are wrong to assimilate metaphor to literal loose talk: metaphors depend on using one thing as a perspective for thinking about something else. I bring out the distinctive way that
metaphor works by contrasting it with two other poetic uses of
language, juxtapositions and “telling details,” that do fit the accounts of metaphor offered by non-cognitivists and contextualists,
respectively.
Consider the following literary metaphors:
(1)

Juliet is the sun.1

(2)

Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player, that struts and frets
his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more.2

(3)

The hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw.3

When we read these sentences in their respective contexts, the effect
seems to be clearly of a different kind than that of a typical utterance of
a sentence like (4):

2

There’s beer in the fridge.

While (4) communicates a certain proposition or thought, which is
more or less directly expressed by the sentence that the speaker actually
utters, the primary aim of these metaphorical utterances is to produce
an overall way of thinking, one that is open-ended, evocative, imagistic,
and heavily affective – in short, poetic.4
More specifically, many people have suggested that the poetic power
of these metaphors consists in their ability to make us see one thing as
something else, thereby providing us with a novel perspective on it. Of
course, we don’t literally see Juliet, or life, in any way at all when we
hear (1) or (2); and we can’t determine what is supposed to be seen as
what simply by examining the sentence in (3). Still, the idea is that in
these cases, something happens in thought that’s a lot like what happens in perception when we shift from seeing the famous Gestalt figure
as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. In the perceptual case, when we shift
between perspectives, different elements in the figure are highlighted,
and take on a different significance: for instance, the duck’s bill becomes the rabbit’s ears. We are under no illusion that the figure itself
– the arrangement of dots and lines – has changed, but its constituent
elements now hang together in a different structure for us. Further, the
difference in our perception is not just a matter of apprehending a new
proposition: we already knew that the figure could be seen as a rabbit,
and that those were supposed to be the ears, for instance. Rather, the
difference is experiential, intuitive, and holistic. Similarly, the intuition
goes, with metaphor: when Romeo tells us that Juliet is the sun, he is
not primarily asking us to accept some particular proposition. Rather,
he wants us to adopt a certain perspective on Juliet, which structures
much of what we know about her in a holistic, intuitive, experiential
way. And if we do adopt this perspective, even temporarily, then certain
of Juliet’s features – such as her beauty, her uniqueness, and the warmth
with which she fills his heart – will be highlighted in our thinking, and
will take on a new significance for us.
Theorists who take the poetic, perspectival effects of metaphors
like (1) through (3) seriously often conclude from these observations
that metaphors are simply in a different line of business from ordinary
workaday utterances like (4). Metaphor is a non-cognitive phenomenon,
they claim – not in the sense that metaphors don’t have cognitive effects,
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but in that a speaker doesn’t mean any propositional content by them.
Thus, Donald Davidson (1978, 46) claims that a metaphor is “like a
picture or a bump on the head,” in causing us to “appreciate some fact
– but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact.” Instead, he claims,
metaphors work by “prompting,” “inspiring,” “provoking or inviting” us
to appreciate some fact, by comparing one thing with another. And in
doing this, metaphors aren’t particularly distinctive – metaphor and its
close cousin simile are merely two “among endless devices that serve to
alert us to aspects of the world by inviting us to make comparisons”
(1978, 40). Likewise, Richard Rorty holds that metaphors are like
“scraps of poetry which send shivers down our spine, non-sentential
phrases which reverberate endlessly, [and] change our selves and our
patterns of action, without ever coming to express beliefs or desires”
(1987, 285); they “do not (literally) tell us anything, but they do make
us notice things...They do not have cognitive content, but they are responsible for a lot of cognitions” (1987, 290).5 One way to motivate
non-cognitivism about metaphor – though not one that either Davidson or Rorty themselves endorse – is to claim that sentences like (1)
through (3) are so deviant if construed literally that they can’t enter
into the sorts of rational inferences that are essential for meaning; like
bumps and birdsongs, they can only cause reactions in their hearers.6
Another influential view of metaphor takes the opposite tack. Contextualists and Relevance Theorists like Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1985; 1986), Robyn Carston (2002), Anne Bezuidenhout (2001),
and François Recanati (2001) tend to focus on ordinary conversational
metaphors, such as
(5)

Bill’s a bulldozer. He doesn’t let anyone stand in his way.

These utterances clearly are used to make propositional assertions, much
like literal utterances like (4). Given this similarity, they argue that
metaphor isn’t such a special use of language after all – or at least, that
we get a distorted understanding of metaphor if we focus on the fact
that sentences like (1) through (3) are false or otherwise ‘deviant’. Instead, they think, when we hear a metaphor, we process it in just the
same way we process other forms of ‘loose talk’, such as an utterance of
(6)
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to communicate that the steak is undercooked. In both cases, the sentence’s semantically encoded meaning serves as a skeleton for the construction of a new, context-specific meaning, which is what the speaker
says.
I think that each of these views gets something importantly right
about metaphor. But at the same time, because each assimilates metaphor to something else – bumps on the head and ordinary loose talk,
respectively – they miss an important part of its distinctive workings and
power. In §1, I’ll argue against the non-cognitivist that the fact that metaphors can produce such rich, non-propositional, perspectival effects
is fully compatible with their having a meaning in a perfectly standard
sense of the term. And in §2, I’ll argue against the contextualist that
even though we do usually process metaphors more or less automatically, they still depend on a felt gap between what the speaker says and
what she means. I will establish these problems with non-cognitivism
and contextualism by contrasting metaphor with two other poetic uses
of language – juxtapositions and “telling details”. By seeing how these
phenomena differ from metaphor, even though they also induce openended perspectives, we can see more clearly what is distinctive about
metaphor after all.
1. METAPHOR AND JUXTAPOSITION

According to the non-cognitivist, metaphors work like bumps on the
head or flashes of light: they cause effects in their hearers, but they
don’t mean or stand for those effects. In particular, the non-cognitivist
is committed to the claim that the predicative structure of (1) and (2) is
irrelevant: according to him, we could achieve the same effect by dropping the copula and simply juxtaposing the two subjects – Juliet and the
sun, or life and a walking shadow. And indeed, poets do often employ
juxtaposition in order to produce precisely the sorts of perspectives that
non-cognitivists point to with metaphor. For instance, in Ezra Pound’s
“In a Station of the Metro,” we are invited to think of faces as flowers;
indeed, we might say that a metaphorical ‘are’ floats implicitly between
the two lines:

The steak is raw.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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In a Station of the Metro
The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals on a wet, black bough.
Likewise, in Walt Whitman’s “A Noiseless Patient Spider,” even though
there’s no missing ‘is’, we’re clearly expected to compare the spider of
the first stanza with Whitman’s soul in the second:
A Noiseless Patient Spider
I mark’d where on a little promontory it stood isolated,
Mark’d how to explore the vacant vast surrounding,
It launch’d forth filament, filament, filament out of itself,
Ever unreeling them, ever tirelessly speeding them.
And you O my soul where you stand,
Surrounded, detached, in measureless oceans of space,
Ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing, seeking the spheres
to connect them,
Till the bridge you will need be form’d, till the ductile anchor hold,
Till the gossamer thread you fling catch somewhere, O my
soul.
The effect that Pound is after is largely imagistic: we’re supposed to
visualize a collection of faces, and see them as petals, or at least notice
an affinity between the ‘apparition’ in our minds and the image of wet
petals on a bough. By contrast, the ‘seeing as’ in Whitman’s poem is
less visual and more like the open-ended patterns of thought produced
by (1) through (3). The spider serves as a frame that highlights certain
features of Whitman’s soul – for instance, his endless striving for meaningful connection; while downplaying others – for instance, the fact
that these strivings are most likely pursued over tea and coffee and involve intellectual conversation.7 Crucially, though, these poems achieve
their perspectival effects without arousing any temptation to assign a
hidden meaning to the poet’s words: those words merely invite or inspire us to further thought. So too, the non-cognitivist maintains, with
metaphor: we should abandon the inclination to speak of metaphorical meaning, and just talk about the cognitions and feelings that the
metaphor prompts.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The question we need to ask is whether the non-cognitivist is right
to assimilate metaphors to juxtapositions in this way. We can break this
down into two subsidiary questions: first, is the non-cognitivist right to
insist that neither juxtaposition nor metaphor involves meaning? And
second, are juxtaposition and metaphor really equivalent: does juxtaposition do all that metaphor does?
I think the answer to the first question is ‘no’: both juxtaposition and
metaphor do involve meaning. It’s true that we don’t feel the need to
assign a special meaning to Pound’s or Whitman’s words; but that’s not
the only sort of meaning there is. Consider an utterance of (7), offered
as a letter of recommendation for a job teaching philosophy:
(7)

Mr. X is punctual and has good handwriting.

By uttering (7), the speaker doesn’t just try to implant the idea that
Mr. X is a bad philosopher into her hearer’s head, in the way that an
advertiser might try to implant a desire for cigarettes by using product
placement in a movie, or as Moe might try to implant the thought that
Curley should go home by hitting him on the head with a two-by-four.
Rather, the speaker of (7) intends for her hearers to think that Mr. X is
a bad philosopher because they recognize that she uttered (7) in order
to get them to recognize that that’s what she’s trying to get them to
think. That is, (7) exemplifies the sort of self-reflexive intention that
defines Grice’s (1989) notion of speaker’s meaning. But now, returning
to juxtapositions and metaphors, it seems clear that they too exhibit
this sort of self-reflexive intention. Whitman, for instance, is inviting
his hearers to think about his soul in the light of a comparison with a
spider, and to do so because we recognize that this is what he’s inviting
us to do.
A non-cognitivist might well concede this; but he would still object that there’s a crucial difference between the kind of effect that the
speaker wants to produce in (7) and the effect that Whitman wants to
produce by his poem. With (7), the speaker intends to communicate a
fairly specific propositional message: that Mr. X is a bad philosopher.
By contrast, the effect Whitman is after is poetic and perspectival. And
this, the non-cognitivist insists, isn’t the right kind of thing to be considered meaning at all, whether as speaker’s meaning or as sentence
meaning. As Davidson puts it,
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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If what the metaphor makes us notice were finite in scope
and propositional in nature, this would not in itself make
trouble. . . But in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor
calls to our attention, and much of what we are caused to
notice is not propositional in character. . . .How many facts
or propositions are conveyed by a photograph?. . . Bad question. A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other
number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a
picture (1978, 46).
In particular, if we’re asked what ‘message’ Pound is trying to convey,
we want to respond that this misses the real interest of his juxtaposition
in particular and of poetry in general.
I agree with the non-cognitivist that the perspectives that are induced by both metaphor and juxtaposition aren’t themselves suitable
to be called meaning in a standard sense of the term, because they are
essentially non-propositional (see Reimer, this volume, for a dissenting
view). As we might put it, a perspective provides us with a tool for
thinking rather than a thought per se. But this is compatible with the
possibility that juxtapositions and metaphors also convey propositional
messages. And I think they do. The Whitman of “A Noiseless Patient
Spider” communicates, among other things, that he is lonely. Likewise,
in uttering (1), Romeo communicates, among other things, that Juliet
is the most beautiful girl in Verona. In saying (2), Macbeth communicates that the frenzy of jostling for power is fleeting, and that death
ultimately takes us all. And so on. These messages clearly don’t come
close to exhausting the total cognitive and imaginative upshot of their
utterances, and it’s not clear that I’ve gotten these particular claims just
right. But these worries often apply to paraphrases of literal utterances
as well. Further, even if their total import is essentially open-ended,
this doesn’t imply that juxtapositions and metaphors don’t express any
propositional content at all, or that we can’t make our paraphrases as
nuanced and detailed as our current purposes demand (Camp, 2006a).
So I think that both juxtapositions and metaphors do produce
speaker’s meanings, in Grice’s sense. What about our second question:
are juxtapositions and metaphors equivalent? The fact that Grice himself (1975, 53) treated metaphor as a form of conversational implicature, on a par with the content communicated by an utterance of (7),
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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might lead us to expect that they are. However, I think that here too,
the answer is clearly ‘no’. We can see why by returning to (7). By
expressing herself so indirectly, the speaker avoids going on record as
actually saying anything mean about Mr. X: she cannot be quoted or
otherwise cited as saying anything unkind. Someone might object that
given the context of utterance, it was perfectly obvious that the speaker
meant that Mr. X is a bad philosopher. However, while this might well
be obvious for many practical purposes, it is still open to the speaker to
respond that it only appeared obvious to the hearer because he made
additional assumptions about her communicative intentions, and to insist that those assumptions were unwarranted in this case. Indeed, it is
precisely the desire to preserve the option of such a response that presumably led the speaker to express herself in such a roundabout way
in the first place. While such a response may be disingenuous, it is
one that politicians and diplomats offer regularly, and one that is not
available in cases where the speaker has directly and literally stated
her intended meaning (Camp, 2006b, 2007). Thus, implicatures offer a
brand of communication with deniability.
Because juxtapositions merely place two topics side-by-side without
explicitly connecting them, they offer a similar species of deniability.
This is nicely evident, I think, in parables. Parables are a classic form of
juxtaposition (indeed, the term “parable” derives from a Greek expression meaning “casting beside”). Specifically, consider Jesus’ parable of
the sower (Matthew 13: 1-9):
The same day went Jesus out of the house, and sat by the
sea side. And great multitudes were gathered together unto
him, so that he went into a ship, and sat; and the whole
multitude stood on the shore. And he spake many things
unto them in parables, saying, “Behold, a sower went forth
to sow; And when he sowed, some [seeds] fell by the way
side, and the fowls came and devoured them up. Some fell
upon stony places, where they had not much earth: and
forthwith they sprung up, because they had no deepness of
earth; and when the sun was up, they were scorched; and
because they had no root, they withered away. And some
fell among thorns; and the thorns sprung up, and choked
them. But others fell into good ground, and brought forth
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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fruit, some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold.
Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.”
This is all that Jesus says to the assembled multitude. The clear implication is that different people are better or worse equipped to receive the
revelations of God’s message: some are too distracted to hear it at all,
some achieve only a superficial and fleeting understanding, but a few
understand deeply and richly. If the parable’s message is so obvious,
though, why doesn’t Jesus just say it outright? Immediately following
his speech, his disciples ask him this very question; and Jesus responds:
Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing
see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.
That is, much as with (7), the parable enables Jesus to communicate
his message to his intended audience, but without coming out and saying it explicitly for just anyone to hear. By telling the story in a context
that invites a certain analogy to those who are prepared to make certain interpretive assumptions, Jesus avoids making himself vulnerable
to misunderstanding by those who are not ready. In particular, by leaving the crucial assumptions unstated, he avoids accusations of heresy
by the religious establishment. Further, though, by leaving the analogy
implicit, Jesus also forces his intended hearers – those who do have
the metaphorical ears to hear – to make the relevant assumptions and
to cultivate the relevant perspective for themselves. This in turn leads
them to assume more interpretive responsibility for that perspective,
and it makes the ultimate message itself seem more objective and less
the idiosyncratic invention of a single individual, than it would otherwise. This is why parables are such good teaching tools: they present
a message in a concrete, vivid form, which is highly memorable once
it has been grasped, but which the hearer must actively construct for
himself.
So juxtapositions work especially well for Jesus, given his particular rhetorical aims. In other communicative contexts, these distinctive
rhetorical effects aren’t so appropriate, and hence juxtapositions don’t
work as well. To see this, consider another parable: that of King David
and the prophet Nathan (2 Samuel: 11-12). King David has summoned
Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah, who is a soldier in David’s army, to the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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palace to sleep with him. When she becomes pregnant, David orders
Uriah to be sent to “the forefront of the hottest battle” and exposed to
enemy attack. Uriah is killed; and David, feeling rather smug, summons
Bathsheba to live with him in the palace. The Lord then sends Nathan
to rebuke David, and Nathan tells the following story:
There were two men in one city; the one rich, and the other
poor. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds:
But the poor man had nothing, save one little ewe lamb,
which he had bought and nourished up: and it grew up
together with him, and with his children; it did eat of his
own meat, and drank of his own cup, and lay in his bosom,
and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveler
unto the rich man, and he spared to take of his own flock
and of his own herd, to dress for the wayfaring man that
was come unto him; but took the poor man’s lamb, and
dressed it for the man that was come to him.
Upon hearing this story, David becomes enraged at the rich man’s behavior. Nathan then says to him: “Thou art the man”; and David repents. As Ted Cohen (1997, 231-242) and Josef Stern (2000, 260-1)
have argued, David repents because the story induces a shift in the aspect under which he thinks about his situation. He acquires no new
first-order beliefs about his actions or their effects: he already knew
that Uriah loved Bathsheba; that she was Uriah’s only wife; that he,
David, had many wives and riches; that it’s generally wrong to take
things without compensation; and so on. What the story does is to
cause him to restructure the relative prominence of these facts and the
explanatory connections among them. In particular, by attending to the
poor man’s feelings, needs, and rights in a case where he has no vested
interest, David becomes aware of Uriah’s point of view in a new and
palpable way.
This, again, is just the sort of open-ended, intuitive, emotionallyladen perspectival effect that is associated with metaphor. And Nathan
could have produced this same effect even if he had left off his final
line: he could have simply told the parable, and then mentioned how
sad it was that Uriah, who so dearly loved his only wife, had been
killed in battle. By juxtaposing the two situations, Nathan would have
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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intimated that there was an important connection between them. If he
cast enough knowing glances, nudges and winks at David, he would
likely have succeeded in causing David to see his own situation through
the story’s lens. Nathan could thereby have insinuated or implicated
that David did a bad thing. According to the non-cognitivist, this is
all that speakers of metaphorical utterances can ever do; the difference
between juxtapositions and metaphors is just that the former “invite” us
to make a comparison, while the latter “bully” us into making it (1978,
41).
However, I think it’s clear that by saying “Thou art the man,” Nathan
does something more than just hint or insinuate. Although he speaks
metaphorically, he still asserts something about David – even if it’s hard
to put that something into exact literal terms. And by doing so, Nathan
puts himself in a palpably more dangerous situation than if he had
simply juxtaposed the two situations, however much he’d nudged and
winked. Assertion involves putting oneself down on record as committed to some content, and thereby makes one responsible for justifying
its truth if challenged (Brandom, 1983; Green, 2000). By coming out
and accusing David, Nathan puts himself on the line in the way that
neither the writer of the damning letter of recommendation, nor Jesus
with his parable, do.
This case brings out the difference between juxtaposition, as a form
of implicature, and metaphor, as a form of assertion (or other speech
act) especially forcefully. In other cases, the difference is less dramatic,
but I think it’s still real, and rhetorically significant. Whitman’s poem,
for instance, exploits the same kind of inexplicitness we find in Jesus’
parable, and in order to achieve a similar rhetorical effect. By the time
we reach the point in the poem where Whitman explicitly speaks about
his soul in spidery terms, in the second-to-last line, we’ve already been
forced to construct the analogy between spider and soul for ourselves;
as with Jesus’ parable, this leads us to take more interpretive responsibility for the analogy, and makes it seem more natural. And even in
the final lines, when Whitman does employ explicit metaphors, such
as describing his attempts at emotional connection as “the gossamer
thread you fling,” these all still presuppose that basic metaphor of soulas-spider – the basic metaphor remains implicit throughout.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Suppose, though, that Whitman had instead written the following
lines as the opening of the second stanza:
Oh my soul, you are that spider.
You too stand on the precipice, casting forth
gossamer threads of conversation, in the hope that they
catch somewhere.
In that case, his primary communicative purpose would still have been
the same: to invite us to use the spider as a perspective for thinking
about his soul. But introducing an explicit predicative relationship between the spider and his soul would have made a substantive rhetorical
difference. Whitman would now be responsible for defending the claim
that his soul is a certain way, one which is determined by comparing
his soul to the spider of the first stanza. It would now be possible for
someone to object to this claim, for instance by pointing out that in fact
Whitman had lots of bosom companions, or that he didn’t even try to
get out and see people. If these objections were sufficiently on point,
then Whitman’s revised poem wouldn’t just be less illuminating or insightful. He would have asserted something false – even if it would be
crass to insist on pointing out this falsity, on the grounds that it doesn’t
affect the poem’s internal aesthetic merits. Thus, the question of what
message a poet is trying to convey is not a bad one in the sense that it
suffers from presupposition failure, because there is no such message;
rather, it may be bad in the sense that it distracts us from features that
matter more to the poem as an aesthetic object.
The fact that metaphors are in the same basic line of communicative business as literal utterances becomes even clearer if we turn our
attention to metaphors that don’t take the form of declarative sentences.
Suppose Whitman were to ask: “Is my soul a spider on a precipice casting its thread, or a honeybee returning to his hive, laden with the fruits
of discovery?” Then his question wouldn’t just offer two different perspectives for thinking about his soul; it would also call for an answer.
Or, suppose a friend were to exhort Whitman to social engagement by
saying “Oh Walt, be a spider and cast out your thread! Linger not alone
on the precipice!” Then he would not just be trying to cause Whitman
to think about himself and his social interactions from a certain perspective. Rather, he would be recommending that Whitman undertake
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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certain actions, ones which might be difficult to specify in literal terms,
but which have genuine conditions of satisfaction nonetheless.
Thus, I think we do have good reason to treat metaphors, not just
as a form of indirect speaker’s meaning on a par with implicature, but
as genuinely undertaking speech acts of the usual sorts. As a result, I
think we have good reason to reject non-cognitivism about even rich,
resonant, poetic metaphors. As we might put it, metaphors don’t just
show us new and surprising features of things in the world – they can
also, pace Rorty, tell us that things are a certain way.8
2. “TELLING DETAILS” AS EMBLEMATIC TRUTHS

In reaction to the excesses of non-cognitivism, the contextualist position
may now seem especially inviting, with its emphasis on the continuity
between metaphor and ordinary speech. In particular, the contextualist
view nicely accounts for the fact that metaphorical utterances, unlike
juxtapositions, genuinely commit the speaker to some content. Contextualists regularly point to the similarity between what a speaker does
by uttering an ordinary conversational metaphor like (5) and what she
does by uttering a literal sentence like (4) as evidence that in speaking metaphorically, a speaker really has said what she meant, and that
her words have taken on a new, contextually-determined meaning – in
marked contrast to the highly indirect communication exemplified by
an implicature like (7).
Confronted with the non-cognitivist’s insistence that poetic metaphors like (1) through (3) are much more open-ended, imagistic, affective, and so on than ordinary conversational metaphors like (5), contextualists can happily acknowledge this to be so, but insist that here too,
we find continuity with ordinary discourse. For instance, a sentence like
(8)

Jane is a real woman now.

appears to be perfectly literal, but it produces the same sorts of perspectival effects as metaphor. Among contextualists, Relevance theorists in
particular are committed to the claim that all communicative effects are
propositional: what makes an utterance ‘poetic’, on their view, is that it
weakly communicates a wide range of propositions rather than strongly
communicates just a few (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Pilkington
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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2000; Wilson and Carston, this volume). Like Davidson, I think that
perspectives can’t be cashed out in propositional terms. But a contextualist could retain the essential core of her position while abandoning
the commitment to exhaustive propositionality. This would seem to
give us the best of both worlds, allowing us to acknowledge both the
perspectival and the propositional uses of metaphor.
The contextualist might appear to find further support for treating
metaphor as an instance of what is said from the fact that while most
metaphors, like (1) through (3), are literally false, there are also plenty
of what Cohen (1976, 254) calls “twice true” metaphors, such as
(9)
(10)

No man is an island.9
The sun blazes bright today; the clouds flee from his mighty
beams.10

The difference between the literal falsity of (1) through (3) or (5) and
the literal truth of (9) and (10) doesn’t seem to make any substantive
interpretive difference – indeed, it may take a moment to even notice
the difference between them. This is just what we would predict if
hearers directly and automatically constructed the speaker’s intended
meaning, without engaging in the kind of roundabout communication
that typifies implicatures like (7).
I agree that “twice true” metaphors like (9) and (10) are functionally on a par with (1) through (3). But I think this is not because the
literal meaning merely plays a behind-the-scenes role in the construction of a new, context-dependent meaning. On the contrary, I think that
what unites these metaphors is that they all involve an intuitively felt
gap between literal and intended meaning, where the first provides the
perspective for constructing the second. And I think this demonstrates
that the contextualist is wrong to assimilate metaphor to literal loose
talk.
To see this, consider the following further pair of metaphors:
(11)

George W. Bush is a primate.

(12)

Jesus was a carpenter.

Unlike (9) and (10), which are merely “twice true,” these metaphors
are “twice apt” (Hills, 1997, 130): they can be not just true, but actually conversationally relevant and appropriate, on both their literal
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech

15

Elisabeth Camp

and metaphorical interpretations. On the one hand, imagine someone
uttering (11) at a Manhattan cocktail party, as a way of communicating
that Bush is a thoughtless, aggressive dope. Here, the utterance seems
like a standard metaphor, which works in the same basic way as (1) or
(9); the speaker might have achieved the same effect by saying “Bush
is a chimpanzee” or “Bush is a gorilla” instead. However, we can also
imagine a context in which the literal meaning of (11) is conversationally relevant: for instance, if uttered by a primatologist to the Union
of Concerned Scientists, as the start of a sustained analysis of Bush’s
foreign policy in terms of aggression, dominance and territory. So too,
we can imagine an analogous pair of utterances for (12). On the one
hand, someone might utter (12) metaphorically, as a way of communicating, roughly, that Jesus took the crooked timber of humanity and
transformed it into something more useful and beautiful. On the other
hand, we can also imagine a context in which the literal meaning is
relevant: say in a Bible study class about Jesus’ life and work, in which
it’s important that Jesus was a humble tradesman who worked with his
hands.
In both (11) and (12), then, we have a sentence that is literally
true, that a speaker could plausibly mean literally, and that can be used
metaphorically to produce the sort of open-ended perspective associated with metaphor, and especially with poetic metaphors.11 Further,
we can imagine contexts for both utterances in which both the literal
and the metaphorical readings are salient. However, I think there’s a
crucial difference between these two cases. If the primatologist continued her analysis of Bush’s actions in terms of primate behavior, then at
least to my ear, (11) would eventually cease to seem like a metaphor at
all, even if the primatologist’s overall point was the same as the cocktail attendee’s – to communicate that Bush is uneducated, aggressive,
and instinctually driven, and to communicate this by cultivating a perspective that’s provided by (11). By contrast, I think that (12) would
continue to feel metaphorical even on a sustained elaboration of both
the literal and extended meanings.
Intuitively, (11) feels like a metaphor only so long as there remains
a gap between what the speaker says and what she intends to convey.
If the primatologist builds a persuasive case, then the intended meaning effectively becomes an entailment of the literal meaning itself. By

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Showing, Telling and Seeing

16

contrast, the reason (11) feels like a metaphor when it is uttered at the
cocktail party is that the speaker is understood as meaning something
different from what she said – where what she is understood as having
said itself involves a contextual narrowing of the semantically encoded
meaning from the full extension of ‘primate’ to a more stereotypical
class, such as chimpanzees or gorillas. This contextually modified literal
meaning is what provides the relevant perspective for thinking about
Bush, which in turn generates the communicated content. Interpreting (11) as a metaphor thus involves an additional stage beyond loose
talk, which simply adjusts the semantically encoded meaning to arrive
directly at the content the speaker intends to be committing herself to.12
As we might put it, if we pay sufficiently sustained attention to both
the semantically encoded meaning and the ultimately intended meaning of (11), then the relation between the two sets of propositions becomes symbolic: the proposition literally expressed is both a subset of,
and provides a perspective for generating, a larger class of communicated propositions. By contrast, the relation between the two sets of
propositions with (12) is closer to being allegorical: the sets are largely
disjoint, and we are invited to use one thing as a perspective for thinking about something else. Likewise, “twice true” metaphors like (9)
and (10) feel metaphorical because they ask us to think of one thing –
mankind, Achilles – in terms of something else – islands, the sun. And
finally, (11) feels metaphorical only so long as we construe the sentence
uttered in such a way that it too provides a vehicle for thinking about
the subject in terms of something else; if we think of Bush as something he actually is, then the perspective and the ultimate content are
no longer metaphorical. The contextualist can’t explain why this disjoint relation between two meanings should be required for metaphor
but not for either symbolism or loose talk, since she maintains that in all
cases the semantically encoded meaning simply serves as a springboard
for constructing a further, extended meaning; and (11) on both of its
readings, as well as (9), (10), and (12), all fit this pattern.13
We can see another respect in which metaphors are importantly discontinuous from utterances where the speaker means what she says if
we return to the contrast between metaphors and juxtapositions in §1.
There, I emphasized that metaphors differ from juxtapositions insofar
as the speaker of a metaphor, but not of a juxtaposition, comes out
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and commits himself to something by making his utterance; this is why
Nathan puts himself on the line by making his final utterance in a way
he wouldn’t have if he’d simply told the parable. However, it’s equally
notable that by speaking metaphorically, Nathan leaves inexplicit in precisely what respects David is like the rich man. By contrast, if he had
actually said what he meant – perhaps something along the lines of
“Like the rich man, thou hath taken unjustifiedly from one with little resources to enrich yourself without need” – then he would have
put himself on record as committed to precisely those contents; and
he could then be held liable for those particular claims, in a way he
can’t simply in virtue of having said “Thou art the man”. Thus, as it
stands, Nathan still preserves a restricted species of deniability about
what he meant. If he is faced with an objector like the one we imagined to the speaker of (7), who insists that it is perfectly obvious that
he intended to communicate that David was wrong to take Bathsheba
to bed when he had so many wives already, Nathan can respond that
this only appears obvious given further interpretive assumptions that he
doesn’t endorse, and that all he meant was that David is like the man in
being rich and blessed with many visitors. In this case, of course, such
a response would be disingenuous; but it is still possible in a way it is
not for utterances where the speaker does mean what she says.14 Further, in some circumstances the fact that metaphor leaves its intended
meaning importantly indirect and inexplicit can have very practical consequences: as the Latvian Minister of Culture, Helena Demakova, said
in her welcoming address to our conference in Riga, when repressive
governments censor their citizens’ speech, metaphor may be one of the
only ways left for people to communicate, precisely because it preserves
a species of deniability that is lacking for explicit utterances.
So we’ve now seen at least two reasons to reject contextualism.
Metaphors are importantly discontinuous from utterances in which the
speaker means what she says, insofar as they rely on a felt gap between
what is intuitively said and what is meant, and insofar as they retain a
kind of deniability about the specific content of the speaker’s assertoric
commitment that is unavailable for literal, direct, and explicit speech.
However, if (11) were just an isolated counterexample to contextualism, it would only be moderately interesting. In fact, though, it is not
so isolated: it points us toward a more general rhetorical trope, which
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we might call the “telling detail” – particular facts that have the power
to reconfigure our overall perspective on the focal subject. And once
again, attending to this larger class of utterances helps to reveal more
clearly the distinctive way that metaphor works.
Like juxtapositions, telling details are often exploited by poets and
politicians, sometimes specifically in lieu of metaphors, for their distinctive rhetorical effects. In particular, although telling details are like
metaphors and juxtapositions in producing open-ended perspectives,
which are often evocative, imagistic, and affective, they involve a distinct mixture of commitment and deniability from that to be found in
either juxtapositions or metaphors. The telling of a telling detail, like
the utterance of a metaphor, involves explicit assertion rather than mere
intimation; this gives it a greater communicative force than juxtaposition. However, unlike with metaphor, the speaker of a telling detail is
actually committed to the truth of what she literally says. Further, the
truth of that detail is all that she asserts. As a result, if she is faced
with the sort of objection we imagined to an utterance of (7), where a
hearer insists that the speaker must have meant some further content
P, she can fall back on her assertion of the detail alone, and disavow
responsibility for any further perspectives or thoughts the hearer might
come to entertain from it. This gives the telling detail a level of deniability that is closer to that of a juxtaposition than of a metaphor.
For instance, where Nathan must admit that he meant something other
than what he said by uttering “Thou art the man,” on pain of rendering
his utterance entirely pointless, a cautious primatologist, faced with the
analogous objection to (11), might defend herself by saying, “All I said
is that Bush is a primate, which he is – you can draw your own conclusions from there.” (Likewise, a conservative American pundit might
say, “All I’m saying is that Obama’s middle name is Hussein!”) Further, because the truth of a telling detail is itself typically sufficient to
render the speaker’s utterance at least minimally cooperative, a telling
detail shifts more of the interpretive responsibility for cultivating the
perspective and for determining its implications onto the hearer. This,
combined with the fact that the detail itself is actually true, tends to
make the perspective feel more apt, and the extended meaning more
objective, than with juxtapositions. As we might put it, where a juxtaposition enables a speaker to wink and nod at an unstated connection

Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech

19

Elisabeth Camp

between two things, and a metaphor actively asserts that something is
a certain way but leaves that way to be determined indirectly by cultivating a comparison, the telling detail seems to speak for itself, with the
speaker merely providing a microphone.
The fact that telling details mean just what they say made them especially attractive to Modernist poets like Pound. Pound (1915) and
other Imagists elevated what they called “luminous details” as a key
means for achieving “direct treatment of the ‘thing”’ – that is, a means
which finds “the exact word” rather than indulging in the “vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous,” that they accused Romantics of employing. Metaphors, by contrast, are especially vulnerable to
magnificent vagueness: magnificent because they typically offer a surprising and vivid perspective on a topic, and vague because they leave
the speaker’s meaning inexplicit, and hence usually at least somewhat
indeterminate.
In particular, Li Po’s poem “The Jewel Stairs’ Grievance” beautifully
exemplifies how luminous details balance precision with rich evocativeness; and Pound’s annotation brings out just how evocative they can be
– even though Li Po’s language is resolutely literal throughout.15
The Jewel Stairs’ Grievance
The jewelled steps are already quite white with dew,
It is so late that the dew soaks my gauze stockings,
And I let down the crystal curtain
And watch the moon through the clear autumn.
— Li Po, trans. Ezra Pound (1915)
TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Jewel stairs, therefore a palace.
Grievance, therefore there is something to complain of.
Gauze stockings, therefore a court lady, not a servant who
complains. Clear autumn, therefore he has no excuse on
account of the weather. Also she has come early, for the
dew has not merely whitened the stairs, but has soaked her
stockings. The poem is especially prized because she utters
no direct reproach.
The poem and annotation also provide a palpable demonstration
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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of how difficult it can be to formulate a complete and adequate paraphrase of even a fully literal utterance: although Pound’s annotation
provides the poem’s readers with useful hints for developing an appropriately open-ended, imagistic, affectively-laden understanding of the
scene being described, it doesn’t aim to restate the poem’s meaning in
explicit and literal terms; and any attempt at a complete paraphrase
would need to be considerably longer and more complex.
Finally, Li Po’s poem also illustrates a rhetorical danger inherent in
employing telling details to communicate. We saw that because they
give the hearer some positive cognitive content directly and explicitly,
telling details offer a distinct combination of commitment and deniability from either juxtapositions or metaphors. But for this very reason,
they also tend to be less open-ended. With juxtaposition and metaphor,
the hearer realizes quite quickly that the speaker has intentionally uttered something that can’t be adequately interpreted unless he goes
beyond what the speaker actually said; and once we’re already in the
realm of the unsaid but possibly meant, we’re more prone to keep exploring. By contrast, without Pound’s annotation of Li Po’s poem, I
would have been tempted to stop considerably shorter in my interpretive efforts, because I would have been satisfied with the cognitive effects and the aesthetic pleasure I got from the images themselves. In
part, this particular case results from a mismatch of cultural expectations, since Li Po’s intended readers would have been more attuned to
look for further meaning. But it also illustrates a general danger with
communication that goes by way of cultivating a perspective: readers
may not take the speaker’s intention for them to cultivate that perspective as seriously as she had hoped, and so in turn they may miss out on
part of her intended meaning.
3.

CRITERIA FOR A THEORY OF METAPHOR

Given the contrasts we’ve developed among metaphors, juxtapositions,
and telling details, we are now in a position to extract several criteria for an adequate theory of poetic metaphor, and of metaphor more
generally. First, by speaking metaphorically, a speaker undertakes a
speech act, whose illocutionary force is typically given by the grammatical mood of the sentence she utters. In this respect, contextualists and
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Relevance Theorists are correct that metaphors are continuous with ordinary literal talk. However, contra the contextualists, the content to
which the speaker commits herself by speaking metaphorically is distinct from the content of what she said: metaphor differs from loose talk
insofar as it depends upon a felt (albeit usually not explicitly processed)
gap between what is said and what is meant. In this respect, metaphor
contrasts both with juxtapositions, which don’t explicitly commit the
speaker to any speech act at all, and with telling details, which explicitly commit the speaker only to the content that is literally expressed by
the sentence she utters.
Second, by speaking metaphorically, at least with poetic metaphors,
a speaker invites her hearers to cultivate an open-ended, holistic perspective on the topic, one which is often also imagistic, evocative, and
affectively-laden. In this respect, metaphor is just one among many
tropes, including juxtapositions and telling details, which give us tools
for framing our overall understanding of a topic, both by structuring
and coloring a host of specific thoughts, and by suggesting further
thoughts that fit with them. However, we can also say, more specifically,
that metaphors work by making us think about one thing as something
else: Juliet as the sun, for instance. In this respect, Davidson is right
that metaphors are precisely on a par with juxtapositions and similes as
devices that invite us to make comparisons – although he is wrong to
maintain that this is all that metaphor does. And in this respect, both
metaphors and juxtapositions differ from telling details, which provide
us with a perspective by providing us with information about the very
thing we are supposed to think about.
At a minimum, then, an adequate theory of metaphor needs to acknowledge that metaphorical utterances both undertake speech acts
with assessable contents and induce perspectives for thinking about one
thing as something else. I haven’t said much here about the relationship
between those contents and perspectives, except to claim that the content is propositional, even if somewhat vague and indeterminate, while
the perspective is importantly non-propositional. A full exploration of
these topics is well beyond the scope of this paper (see Camp 2003 for
details). Here, I simply want to suggest, first, that the speaker expects
her hearers to determine the content of her speech act by way of cultivating the relevant perspective: the perspective gives hearers the frame
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they need for thinking about the subject in order to identify how the
speaker is claiming (or asking, or ordering) that subject to be. Second,
I want to note that we cannot always read off what we are supposed to
think about, and how we are supposed to thinking about it, from the
surface structure of the sentence uttered. As White (1996) and others
have emphasized, not all metaphors fit the simple ‘a is F’ form exemplified by (1) and (2). Even in more complex cases, however, the speaker
still expects her hearers to think of one thing (the topic) as another
(the frame). In some cases, such as (3), topic and frame are identified by way of some further trope, like metonymy. In other cases, as
with noun phrases used metaphorically, the frame is provided directly
by the words, and the topic is identified contextually. Indeed, sometimes the entire sentence forms a frame for thinking about a situation
that is merely implicitly identified. The fact that we comprehend such
complex cases as easily as we do is a testimony to just how nuanced our
powers of pragmatic interpretation are.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from our discussion,
however, is that we need to attend to the specific behavior of the linguistic phenomena we are investigating. Language can be poetic – in
the sense of inducing evocative, open-ended, holistic, imagistic, and/or
affective perspectives – in a variety of ways. Just because metaphor
does this doesn’t mean that it can’t also accomplish the same sorts of
tasks as ordinary language. And conversely, just because metaphor falls
on a continuum with literal loose talk doesn’t mean that it doesn’t also
differ from it in crucial ways.
Notes
1

from Romeo and Juliet II.ii.2.
from Macbeth V.v.28-30.
3
from Auden’s translation of Sitnitsky’s ‘Our Bias’.
4
Here I follow what I take to be ordinary (philosophical) use in lumping all of these
qualities together under the rubric ‘poetic’. Not all metaphors in poetry exemplify these
qualities; and metaphors in fiction, politics, and ordinary speech sometimes do. Further,
these qualities don’t always occur together; see my (2003, §5.3) for discussion.
5
Other noncognitivists about metaphor include Ayer 1936, Carnap 1935, Cooper
1986, Reimer 2001, and Taylor 1989.
6
I argue (2004) that syntactically well-formed but semantically absurd sentences are
meaningful and do express truth-assessable contents.
2
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7
By speaking of “Whitman’s soul,” I don’t intend to beg any important questions about
the relationship between the author and the poem’s implied speaker; I mean this as shorthand for “the soul of the implied speaker of the poem.”
8
Unless the speaker is an actor on stage, practicing her rhetorical powers, being sarcastic, or otherwise only making as if to undertake the relevant speech act. Note also
that a speaker may employ a sentence with one grammatical mood metaphorically, in
order to undertake a speech act with a different illocutionary force, for instance by uttering a declarative sentence with an interrogative tone in order to ask a question. These
possibilities don’t differentiate metaphorical from literal speech, however.
9
from Donne’s Meditation XVII.
10
from an imagined reworking of the Iliad, describing Achilles as he rages on the
battlefield.
11
While the perspective produced by the primatologist’s utterance of (11) may be fairly
open-ended, it may seem unlikely that it will be imagistic, evocative, or affectively-laden.
I think that with sufficient rhetorical effort, even a primatologist’s perspective could be
poetic – in particular, it might highlight certain simian features of Bush’s physiognomy.
But even if this particular perspective is not poetic, this shouldn’t affect the argument
insofar as the imagined utterance of (11) does produce a perspective, and the lack of
poeticness is not intrinsic.
12
In speaking of a ‘stage’ of interpretation, I mean a step in an adequate rational reconstruction of how the speaker could have meant that by saying this, of the sort that an
ordinary speaker might offer if challenged. This is not necessarily a stage that hearers
explicitly go through in interpretation; see Camp 2006b for discussion. Insofar as Relevance theorists restrict themselves to claims about actual processing, there need be no
disagreement.
13
The contextualist may object that the salient difference between the two readings of
(11) is simply that the cocktail party attendee’s utterance, but not the primatologist’s, is
loose; since metaphor is a species of loose talk, only the former feels metaphorical. However, loose talk can also induce an open-ended perspective without feeling metaphorical,
such as a hyperbolic utterance of (8) applied to a pre-teen. Here, the ‘something else’
we are asked to see the subject as is still too close to something that actually applies to
the subject to generate a metaphor. Relevance theorists may be correct, however, that
hyperbole grades into metaphor as the gap between the subject and its characterization
increases (Wilson and Carston, this volume); nonetheless, differences in degree can add
up to differences in kind.
14
Loose talk and hyperbole fall between fully literal speech and metaphor in this respect.
15
I assume that the stairs really are crusted with jewels, and the curtain made of beaded
crystal.
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